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Alternative Visions for the Federal Criminal Justice
and Corrections System: Is True Change Possible?

States are guided by constitutions that enshrine their core
values. Organizations write mission statements setting out
their values and goals, and develop strategic plans to make
those goals a reality. Congressional values and goals can be
inferred from legislation.
The sentencing reform proposals currently before Congress set out different visions—some very limited, others
quite comprehensive—for federal sentencing and corrections. Frank Bowman suggests there is a bi-partisan consensus that ‘‘federal prisons hold too many people for too
long, and that Congress ought to do something about that.’’1
That is, however, where the agreement ends. The proposals
now before Congress reflect the divergent underlying tenets,
views, and ideologies of their congressional authors. There is
no discernible agreement on a set of core values, let alone an
overarching vision for the federal criminal justice system.
Rather the proposals appear largely animated by ideological
values ranging from cost cutting to a visceral reaction against
mandatory minimums, which all have declared the primary
culprit for the overcrowding of federal prisons.
Even though crime no longer dominates the headlines
the way it did in earlier decades, compromise to decrease
our comparatively and historically high sentences, and
invest in crime prevention and re-entry seems hard to come
by. Relatively intricate sentencing legislation, with
increases and decreases, may make it easier to package
reduced sanctions for some members of Congress who fear
being labeled ‘‘soft on crime,’’ but such provisions may not
substantially alleviate overcrowding in federal prisons, let
alone lead to dramatic overall change in the way our criminal justice system operates.
Some have hailed the bipartisan nature of current legislative proposals as a hopeful augury that some bill will
move forward. In a polarized Congress any consensus
garners acclaim. We should, however, acknowledge that not
all bi-partisan agreement—perhaps especially in criminal
justice—is necessarily salutary. The grand coalition of
conservatives and liberals that united to pass the Sentencing Reform Act of 1986, which spawned the federal sentencing guidelines, may serve as a cautionary example of
how compromises, praised at the time, may have unexpected ramifications. The concomitant War on Drugs, with
its proliferation of mandatory minimum drug sentences,
also drew bipartisan support—a development that has led
to the dramatic rise in federal inmates.

Section I of this article critiques the approaches to
mandatory minimums in the pending bills. Section II
analyzes the corrections provisions of the Sentencing
Reform and Corrections Act (SRACA). The corrections
portion of the SRACA deserves more attention than it has
so far received because of its ideologically driven approach
that is unlikely to lead to a substantially decreased prison
population. Section III turns to the reclassification of drug
offenders as non-violent, while violent offenders are being
singled out for increasing punitiveness. Section IV develops
the role cost and race have played in these proposals.
I. Sentence Reform—Or Rather, Some Reform of Some
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Mandatory Minimums

In its 2011 report on mandatory minimums, the U.S. Sentencing Commission found mandatory minimums to have
contributed to the dramatic expansion of the federal prison
system, but not to be the sole cause.2 Nevertheless, the bills
now before Congress focus primarily on mandatory minimums, especially those for drug offenses. The bills adopt
some of the proposals the Commission made in its 2011
Report, albeit a limited number with a narrow focus.3
As the Sentencing Commission’s 2011 Report outlines,
some object to mandatory minimums as inherently unjust
as they do not allow for consideration of individual characteristics of either the offense or the offender. Mandatory
minimums, however, would constitute a much lesser
problem—practically and philosophically—if set at lower
levels than they currently are. After all, many countries, and
domestic criminal codes, set out sentence minimums in
statutory sentence ranges, presumably to indicate the lowest possible retributive sanction. These have been subject to
little objection because they are set to fulfill minimally
acceptable levels of retributive justice. Proportionality considerations do not appear to be part of the current discourse, however, which may partially explain the focus on
the safety valve rather than broad-based decreases of all
mandatories.
Nonetheless, for legislators concerned about being
labeled soft on crime, an outright decrease in sentence
lengths for all mandatories remains challenging, or perhaps unthinkable. That seems true with respect to most
drug mandatories. Perhaps for this reason, some of the
pending bills do not reduce the length of existing
mandatories, but broaden the reach of so-called ‘‘safety
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valve’’ provisions that grant the federal judiciary the
option—and responsibility—to choose the appropriate
sentence. This approach allows Congress to create some
leeway for a smaller prison population without shouldering
the blame should individual offenders commit serious
crimes after an earlier release.
The Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015 (SSA), proposed by
Senators Lee and Durbin, presents a direct response as it
would about halve mandatory minimum drug sentences for
select drug offenders. It would also expand the statutory
safety valve to those within Criminal History Category II.
Despite the signaling effect of the level of mandatory minimums on sentences in general, especially with the Sentencing Commission instructed to adjust guideline ranges
in light of the new mandatories, judges are able to go well
above and beyond them, up to the statutory maximum.
Because of its explicit recognition that drug mandatories
are too high and the Commission guidance it requires to be
given federal judges in drug cases, the SSA is preferable
over the Leahy-Paul Justice Safety Valve Act of 2015. That
legislation would undermine—though not formally abolish—all mandatory minimums as federal judges could
sentence below them as long as the sanction achieves the
purpose of punishment. This approach provides federal
judges with nearly unfettered and unguided discretion, and
destroys any semblance of sentence uniformity. Such an
approach leads inevitably to the problems the federal
guidelines were designed to address. It also sets federal
judges up to fail, as they will provide an easy target for
blame should offenders who receive lower sentences than
the still existing mandatory recidivate.
Lest one misunderstood, with the exception of the Justice Safety Valve Act of 2015, none of the congressional bills
proposed recognize the inherent problems with all (high)
mandatory minimums. Rather they present a very limited
approach, largely focused on what are now declared ‘‘nonviolent drug offenders.’’ Generally mandatory minimums
remain in place at least for some drug (and gun) offenders.
Low-level and non-violent drug offenders would be
increasingly likely to receive a below-mandatory sentence in
light of expanded safety valve provisions. In addition, some
of the proposed bills include new mandatory minimum
sentences, now focused on the en courant most dangerous,
terrorists and violent criminals, both groups whose precise
contours remain to be defined.4
II. What Reform Worthy of Its Name Would Require

Sentencing law largely determines the size and composition of the federal prison population. However, other factors play a role, including the allocation of policing and
investigatory resources, the division of responsibility
between state and federal authorities, and the exercise of
prosecutorial power and discretion.5 Whereas most of the
proposed legislation is focused on sentencing, with particular emphasis on mandatory sanctions, the SensenbrennerScott SAFE Justice Act and SRACA provide additional
changes, albeit with very different visions. The former sets
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out a broad-based reform proposal for sentencing and corrections, which recognizes and responds to the interplay of
various factors that has led the United States to become the
world’s jailer, but the latter will cause serious challenges at
the back end without constructively addressing the size of
the criminal justice system.
A. Criminalization and Prosecutions

The SAFE Justice Act recognizes the continuum of the
criminal justice system and focuses on some of the unique
characteristics of the federal system. It attempts, for
example, to better balance federal and state prosecutions by
limiting the former to their core. It also implicitly recognizes the proliferation of agency actions and civil sanctions,
and encourages limitations on the proliferation of multiple
venues of proceeding against a defendant.
Limits on criminalization and protections against convicting the innocent are a part of this package.6 The bill also
proposes restrictions on pre-trial detention. Even though
these aspects of the bill do not specifically address sentencing, they would have a substantial impact on federal
prosecutions. For sentencing and the number of inmates in
federal prisons to be truly impacted, it will take more than
changes to some sentences.
B. Corrections, Supervision, and Re-Entry

The SAFE Justice Act propagates more expansive use of
probation to reserve prison space for the most dangerous
offenders, such as serious and high-level drug offenders,
violent and sex offenders. In the federal system, probation
has been very restricted.7 An expansion would allow
offenders to remain at liberty while under supervision,
which would lead to them retaining employment and
family and community ties. It would also facilitate the
payment of fines, restitution, and fees.
The SAFE Justice Act would allow for judicial consideration of early compassionate release for the elderly, the
very ill, and those with care-giving obligations for minor
children. Both the SAFE Justice Act and SRACA allow for
the inmate as well as the Bureau of Prisons to petition
a court for such release, though the latter bill does not
include caregivers.8 Under the SAFE Justice Act, caregiving duties are to be considered only when the current
caregiver of the children is no longer available and no other
suitable caregiver can be found. Although conviction of certain offenses makes the offender ineligible for such release,
recognition of caregiving duties as a reason for early release
is notable. It is not necessarily a gendered provision, though
it is possible that more women would benefit.
The provision is remarkable as it recognizes the impact
of imprisonment on the family of the offender and especially on the offender’s minor children. A recent American
Bar Foundation study indicates that the repercussions of
maternal imprisonment extend well beyond the inmate’s
own children to other children in the same community.9
The impact of this provision in federal prisons would likely
be limited despite the high percentage of imprisoned
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parents.10 Nevertheless, it may influence reconsideration of
family impact at sentencing, in both state and federal
courts.
Of much broader applicability are the in-prison programming and re-entry aspects of the two legislative proposals. Programming builds on evidence-based practices
and begins in prison, based on individual needs assessments, which are to determine criminogenic risks and
needs. The SAFE Justice Act includes comprehensive
alcohol- and cognitive-needs-based programming as well as
vocational training. The goal is to make available the
appropriate level of treatment and training to every inmate.
Although the Act provides for time credit to those complying with their case plan, it does not extend such credits to
those convicted of intentional homicide, terrorism, and sex
offenses, though other incentives may be provided to these
inmates. Nevertheless, it opens the programs to all inmates
who need them.
The SRACA, on the other hand, excludes a substantial
and much broader group of offenders from earning time
credits, based on their prior criminal record or the crime of
conviction.11 It is unclear whether this provision is meant to
provide additional punishment. It seems curious that those
most likely to recidivate12 will not be able to benefit from the
most valuable rewards for completing prison-based
programming.
The Federal Probation and Pretrial Services employ
a risk assessment instrument, the Post Conviction Risk
Assessment (PCRA), that was created over a number of
years based on the largest data set ever used by them.13 It
was developed to accomplish the mission-critical goal of
recidivism reduction. It is based on the principles of
‘‘[i]dentifying and working most intensively with the highest risk offenders (risk principle), identifying criminogenic
needs (need principle), and identifying and compensating
for potential barriers to treatment (responsivity
principle). . . . ’’14 It allows identification of factors that
increase the likelihood of recidivism and helps in developing responsive strategies to address an offender’s needs. By
statute, federal probation officers are mandated to ‘‘use all
suitable methods, not inconsistent with the conditions
specified by the court, to aid a probationer or a person on
supervised release who is under his supervision, and to
bring about improvements in his conduct and condition.’’15
That approach seems to contrast jarringly with SRACA.
The approach SRACA proposes is likely to increase
tensions in federal prisons as offenders will be given different levels of access to services and to time-based rewards,
in a way that must appear random and unfair to many
inmates. It will also prove counterproductive in reducing
recidivism as all evidence indicates that the prisonsupervision continuum of treatment and care is most
effective in decreasing future crime.
To some extent the denial of services and time credit
appears to reflect a desire that these inmates be never
released—despite the unlikelihood of that outcome.16 The
exclusion of those perceived to have the highest risk of

re-offending resembles the inclusion of a formal incapacitative component in their sentences. Although some
countries recognize such an additional sentence element, it
is usually imposed at sentencing and subject to some procedural protections. Here it will be largely, though not
exclusively, the Bureau of Prisons that will make the
determination that may set up an offender for further failure. As the Federal Defenders explain in their letter, this
proposed approach contradicts the practice in all state corrections systems that use risk assessment tools. It indicates
a further move away from proportionate punishment and
toward risk-based punishment. Here that sanction is particularly crude as it is solely tied to the likelihood of recidivism but not to the magnitude of the potential harm
inflicted.17
Even if it were feasible to move one’s risk category down
while imprisoned, the value of such a change upon release
may be questionable. After all federal prisons differ significantly from life on the outside. They do not operate
under a mandate to approximate such conditions, as, for
example, German prisons do.18 Long sentences reinforce
concerns about the SRACA risk instrument and its use as
they increase an inmate’s distance from society and
increase the likelihood that family connections and skills
atrophy.
Even for those who can earn time credit, the reward is
limited. Under the SAFE Justice Act, program participation
will reduce the sentence by up to one year. Among the
positive features are the focus on mental health and substance abuse residential treatment and grants to the states
for medicated abuse treatment. However, the maximum
reward time that can be earned for good behavior, program
and work participation amounts to not quite a one-third
reduction in the sentence. Any supervision violations are to
carry graduated sanctions, and supervision successes will
be rewarded with earlier discharges from supervision.
This post-sentence structure is critical. The Federal
Probation and Pretrial Services supervise approximately
130,000 people annually.19 In contrast to the SAFE Justice
Act, under SRACA any reward time would be converted
into supervision time outside prison, not outright release.
That means that an offender would be released earlier but
to a residential re-entry program, home confinement, or
community supervision. This approach is disconcerting for
two reasons: First, at least in the short and medium term,
the number of those under supervision would presumably
rise even if the imprisonment numbers were to fall. Second, this could facilitate a move from mass imprisonment
to mass supervision of offenders. Private contractors may
benefit from this increase as they frequently run residential
re-entry facilities and supervise home confinement. The
financial stake such a development would create might
become challenging to dismantle later.20
Most federal offenders are being sentenced to postprison supervision, either based on statutory mandate or
judicial orders.21 In only approximately 12 percent of
cases is supervision terminated early. Revocations from
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post-sentence supervision stand at approximately one third
of all cases, with those supervisees with a higher criminal
history background failing at higher rates.22 The SAFE
Justice Act includes performance incentive funding for
judicial districts that reduce their revocation rates.
Although some of the proposals included would presumably add some costs for services, decreased recidivism
would constitute a substantial financial gain. The bill
includes a number of additional proposals that would likely
add expenses but also dramatically change federal prisons
and police forces. It suggests an increase in the number of
psychologists and social workers in federal prisons to better
prepare inmates for their release. This is a model used in
a number of European countries. Although desirable, an
increase in the quantity and quality of psychologists and
social workers can only have a limited impact as long as
sentences remain as long as they currently are. Re-entry
and reintegration after five, let alone ten or more years of
living in a closed, artificial institution with its own subculture will remain challenging.

offenders. Much of the respite comes through expansion of
the established safety valve and creation of a new one.
Those are limited changes, however. Even though the
established safety valve will be available to defendants with
a more extensive criminal history, anyone with a prior
sentence of more than sixty days for a drug trafficking or
violent offense is excluded. The ineligible include those
with relatively minor criminal records, labeling them unfit
and too dangerous for a below-mandatory sentence.
The shift in focus may provide some relief for the large
group of drug offenders and may shift the approach onto
a more medical disease model and off law enforcement. To
what extent the scourge of heroin addiction in often white,
middle- and upper-middle-class communities has contributed to this change may be too early to answer.25 Nevertheless, if the criminal justice system merely turns to
another offender group, some of the stark shortcomings of
our sentencing and corrections regime will remain
unaddressed.
IV. Cost and Racial Disparity—Drivers of Reform?

III. The New Darling: The Non-Violent Offender

The new darling of criminal justice reform is the ‘‘nonviolent offender,’’ who has been declared to deserve another
opportunity and therefore is eligible for treatment and
a shorter prison sentence. Rand Paul’s presidential platform, for example, focuses all efforts on this offender, who
is apparently the only one to experience the ugliness and
despair of our criminal justice system.23 In addition to the
Justice Safety Valve Act of 2015, Paul’s other legislative
proposals all concentrate on non-violent offenders, including the possibility of sealing their records to address the
negative impact of a criminal record, especially in the job
market, and restoring federal voting rights for non-violent
felons. His suggestion to downgrade minor possession
offenses to misdemeanors fits within this spirit.
Drug offenders who had previously been collectively
labeled violent criminals are now partially exempted from
that stigma. The SAFE Justice Act, for example, declares
minor drug violations no ground for the revocation of
supervision. On the other hand, violent and sex offenders
have become the be^ te noire of the criminal justice and corrections system. Domestic violence offenders are deemed
violent criminals, as indicated in SRACA’s addition of
a new mandatory minimum offense for interstate domestic
violence.24
Beginning in the 1990s, all drug offenders were generally painted as dangerous and grouped with violent
offenders. Now at least some of them—‘‘low-level’’ participants who have not actually committed acts of violence—
are escaping this opprobrium. The fault lines of social,
political, and legal categorization have shifted, with violent
offenders—however defined, though excluding some drug
offenders—and sex offenders carrying the brunt of long
sentences and mandatory minimums.
The SRACA continues the condemnation of violent
offenders while providing some relief to non-violent drug
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The proposed bills are ostensibly animated by the sizeable
number of inmates in federal prisons, making corrections
an ever larger part of the Department of Justice’s budget at
the expense of funding for law enforcement and prosecutors. For Republicans, cost is part of the agenda to reduce
wasteful government spending and decrease taxes. Though
cost savings remain nominal drivers of the new legislation,
some of the proposals are unlikely to lead to substantial
savings.26 Instead they may lead to the privatization of
a larger back-end component of federal corrections.
Some of the Democratic members of Congress reference wasteful spending because mandatory minimums are
not empirically proven to decrease crime. In their view the
budget for the Department of Justice should not be
decreased but reallocated to include ‘‘money to hire federal
prosecutors and FBI agents, . . . support . . . state and local
law enforcement and . . . fund[] crime prevention, victim
services and prisoner reentry programs.’’27 In its preamble,
the SAFE Justice Act goes farther by stating that savings
gained from smaller prison populations should be reinvested in recidivism prevention efforts. The Act sets a goal
of filling, but not exceeding, current prison bed space.28
The cost question is not a mere ideological artifact but of
crucial consequence for the success of correctional reform.
First, how cost will be measured will drive assessment of
the success of this legislation. Second, if the money is being
re-invested in reentry and prison programming, as the
Sensenbrenner-Scott bill explicitly notes in its preamble,
released inmates will have a better chance to abstain from
crime post-release and re-integrate successfully into their
communities and families. If the money is merely being
saved or reallocated to law enforcement, recidivism will
remain at least as high as it runs currently, and calls for
greater harshness are likely to be heard soon again.
Although the term ‘‘mass imprisonment’’ is being used
critically, racial disparity within the criminal justice system
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is equally disconcerting and appears to be motivating at
least some supporters of these reform proposals. Even
though race has been mentioned only infrequently in the
discussion of these bills, it pervades the discourse.
References to the crack/powder cocaine equality measures and inclusion of retroactivity for the 2010 Fair
Sentencing Act aim at greater racial equality. Senator
Leahy, for example, has gone on record supporting retroactivity, stating that ‘‘[o]ur concerns with proportionality and racial disparity require that these reforms apply
to old sentences as well as to new ones.’’29 Retroactivity
will also be an important component of cost control as
well as factor into the environment and control within
federal prisons.
The focus on low-level drug crimes generally appears to
be a nod toward the racial inequality pervading drug
enforcement that is ultimately reflected in the make-up of
the federal inmate population. The Democratic members of
the House who co-sponsored the Sentencing Reform Act
of 2015 frequently mentioned the impact of the legislation
on African American inmates and drug offenders.30 The
SAFE Justice Act of 2015 explicitly demands that the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, in determining drug sentences,
consider a set of congressional mandates, including ‘‘the
need to reduce and prevent racial disparities in Federal
sentencing.’’31
The impact, however, may be limited as many of the
proposals seem headed for greater, though unacknowledged, disparity. The Justice Safety Valve Act of 2015, for
example, does not recognize the potential inequalities that
may be created by lifting all federal mandatories. In light of
the disparities between districts in the percentage of
defendants receiving Booker adjustments and those
benefitting from prosecutorially authorized downward
departures,32 unwarranted disparities may already be
developing, which the expansion of the safety valve may
further enhance. Unfettered discretion to sentence below
mandatories will reinforce perceptions of, if not actual,
disparity.
As offense and criminal history categories reflect distinct racial, gender, and socio-economic make-up, distinctions created on those bases will have a substantial
differential impact. The Commission has highlighted its
concern that SRACA’s back-end provisions, for example,
will violate principles of non-discrimination based on such
demographic differences.33
Another area in which great disparity will occur is with
respect to SRACA’s proposed juvenile sealing and expungement provisions that are, not surprisingly, only available
to the ‘‘non-violent juvenile offender,’’ a negligibly small
group in the federal system.34 Although theoretically commendable, in effect these provisions hold out an empty
promise. The Bureau of Prisons indicates that most juvenile offenders are violent, and historically the vast majority
of them have been Native Americans.35 For these reasons,
the purpose of these provisions will have an insignificant
but disparate impact.

V. Conclusion

The so-called reform proposals present very limited reforms.
Although some of the individual provisions would provide
salutary results, others set the stage for continuing severity in
our sentencing and corrections system, justified by the fact
that this time we are dealing with truly dangerous offenders.
Rather than drug offenders, we now call them violent criminals, sex offenders, and terrorists. And who would argue for
shorter sentences or earlier release for those groups?
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